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Best Practices for using Pyth Price Feeds

This page provides some technical details about Pyth price feeds that are necessary to use them safely and correctly. Please read this page before using Pyth price feeds in your application.

Price Feed IDs

Each Pyth Network price feed is referred to via a unique id. However, the ids may be represented in different formats (e.g., hex or base58) depending on the blockchain. Price feeds also have different ids in mainnets than testnets or devnets. The full list of price feeds is listed on the pyth.network website. The price feed ids page lists the id of each available price feed on every chain where they are available. To use a price feed on-chain, look up its id using these pages, then store the feed id in your program to use for price feed queries.

Fixed-Point Numeric Representation

Price feeds represent numbers in a fixed-point format. The same exponent is used for both the price and confidence interval. The integer representation of these values can be computed by multiplying by 10^exponent. As an example, imagine Pyth reported the following values for AAPL/USD:

Field Value
exponent -5
conf 1500
price 12276250

The confidence interval is 1500 * 10^(-5) = $0.015, and the price is 12276250 * 10^(-5) = $122.7625.

Price Availability

Sometimes, Pyth will not be able to provide a current price for a product. This situation can happen for various reasons. For example, US equity markets only trade during certain hours, and outside those hours, it's not clear what an equity's price is. Alternatively, a network outage (at the internet level, blockchain level, or at multiple data providers) may prevent the protocol from producing new price updates. (Such outages are unlikely, but integrators should still be prepared for the possibility.) In such cases, Pyth may return a stale price for the product.

Integrators should be careful to avoid accidentally using a stale price. The Pyth SDKs guard against this failure mode by incorporating a staleness check by default. Querying the current price will fail if too much time has elapsed since the last update. The SDKs expose this failure condition in an idiomatic way: for example, the Rust SDK may return None, and our Solidity SDK may revert the transaction. The SDK provides a sane default for the staleness threshold, but users may configure it to suit their use case.

Market Hours

Pyth price feeds follow the traditional market hours of each asset classes and will be available at the following hours:

Asset Class Opening Hours Exceptions
Crypto 24/7 No market close
US Equities Every weekday from 2.30PM UTC to 9PM UTC Markets are closed on weekends, US Holidays, and during extraordinary events
FX From Sunday 5PM UTC to Friday 5PM ET. Trading is closed from 10PM to 11PM UTC daily Trading continues during most US holidays
Metals From Sunday 5PM UTC to Friday 5PM ET. Trading is closed from 10PM to 11PM UTC daily Spot gold and silver trading also follow CME holiday closures

Latency

Developers integrating Pyth Network price feeds should account for the difference in latency between on-chain oracles and off-chain sources (e.g. centralized exchanges). Although Pyth Network is designed with low latency in mind, no on-chain oracle can match the latency of an off-chain source due to the added overhead for consensus and security. The threat model for integrating protocols should assume that adversaries see price changes a short time before the protocol does. In this threat model, protocol designers should avoid situations where a Pyth price update must race against an adversary's transaction. Adversaries are highly likely to win these races, as they have a head start, and sophisticated adversaries can additionally optimize their network latencies or pay miners for priority blockspace.

This situation is analogous to market making in traditional finance. Market makers place resting orders on exchanges with the hope of earning the bid/ask spread. When the “true price” moves, these market makers get picked off by adverse “smart flow” that is faster than they are. The smart flow is balanced by two-way flow, that is, people wanting to trade for other reasons besides a price change.

This analogy suggests two simple solutions to races:

  1. Configure protocol parameters to balance the losses from smart flow against the gains from two-way flow. Market makers in traditional finance implement this approach by offering a bid/ask spread and limited liquidity. The limited liquidity caps the losses to smart flow, while still earning profits from the two-way flow. A successful market maker tunes the spread and offered liquidity to limit adverse selection from smart traders while still interacting with two-way flow.
  2. Give the protocol a "last look" to decide which transactions to accept. In traditional finance, some exchanges give market makers a chance to walk back a trade offer after someone else has requested it. Protocols can implement this technique by splitting transactions into two parts: a request and a fulfillment. In the first transaction, the user requests to perform an action. In the second transaction, the protocol chooses whether or not to fulfill the user's request; this step can be implemented as a permissionless operation. The protocol can require a short delay between the two transactions, and the user's request gets fulfilled at the Pyth price as of the second transaction. This technique gives the protocol extra time to observe price changes, giving it a head start in the latency race.

Confidence Intervals

At every point in time, Pyth publishes both a price and a confidence interval for each product. For example, Pyth may publish the current price of bitcoin as $50000 ± $10. Pyth publishes a confidence interval because, in real markets, there is no one single price for a product. For example, at any given time, bitcoin trades at different prices at different venues around the world. While these prices are typically similar, they can diverge for a number of reasons, such as when a cryptocurrency exchange blocks withdrawals on an asset. If this happens, prices diverge because arbitrageurs can no longer bring prices across exchanges into line. Alternatively, prices on different venues can differ simply because an asset is highly volatile at a particular point in time. At such times, bid/ask spreads tend to be wider, and trades on different markets at around the same time tend to occur at a wider range of prices.

In a Pyth feed, each publisher specifies an interval $$(p_i-c_i, p_i+c_i)$$ in the form of their price and confidence submission. This interval is intended to achieve 95% coverage, i.e. the publisher expresses the belief that this interval contains the “true” price with 95% probability. The resulting aggregate interval $$(\mu-\sigma, \mu+\sigma)$$, where $$\mu$$ represents the aggregate price and $$\sigma$$ represents the aggregate confidence, is a good estimate of a range in which the true price lies.

To explain this, we consider two cases of publisher estimates. In the first case, there is 100% overlap of all the publishers’ intervals, i.e. each publisher submits the same interval $$(p-c, p+c)$$. In this case, the aggregate confidence interval is exactly that interval, so the aggregate confidence interval provides 100% coverage of the publishers’ intervals. This first case represents normal operating conditions, where most publishers agree about the price of an asset.

In the second case, each publisher specifies an interval that is disjoint from each of the other publishers’ intervals. In this case, the aggregate confidence interval can be seen to contain at least the 25th percentile and at least the 75th percentile of the set of points consisting of each of the publisher’s price, price plus confidence, and price plus confidence. As a result, the aggregate confidence interval is somewhat analogous to an interquartile range of the data, which is a reasonable measure of the spread of a set of points. Note that this is not an IQR of the prices alone of the publishers but rather of the set composed of the 3 points that each publisher submits. Moreover, note that the IQR does not include the most extreme publishers’ prices on either side; this property is necessary to ensure that a small group of publishers cannot manipulate the aggregate confidence interval. This second case represents an atypical scenario where publishers all disagree. Such circumstances are rare but can occur during market volatility or unusual events.

The aggregate confidence interval interpolates between the two cases above as publishers’ prices begin to diverge. In situations closer to case 1 where there is significant overlap of the individual publishers’ intervals, the aggregate interval $$(\mu-\sigma, \mu+\sigma)$$ will capture most of the spread of the individual publishers. In the situation where the prices look more like case 2 with greater disjointness due to different views of the price across different venues, that aggregate interval may be in some eyes an imperfect measure of spread because there may be a number of individual price intervals that lie outside the aggregate interval. In this case, a protocol has a couple of options:

  1. It can use a discounted price in the direction favorable to it. For example, a lending protocol valuing a user’s collateral can use the lower valuation price $$\mu-\sigma$$. When valuing an outstanding loan position consisting of tokens a user has borrowed from the protocol, it can use the higher end of the interval by using the price $$\mu+\sigma$$. This allows the protocol to be conservative with regard to its own health and safety when making valuations.
  2. It can decide that there is too much uncertainty when $$\sigma/\mu$$ exceeds some threshold and choose to pause any new activity that depends on the price of this asset.

To expand upon the first option, we recommend using the confidence interval to protect your users from these unusual market conditions. The simplest way to do so is to use Pyth's confidence interval to compute a range in which the true price probably lies. This principle is common sense. Imagine that you are lending money to a friend, and your friend pledges a bitcoin as collateral. Also imagine that Pyth says the bitcoin price is $50000 +- $1000. (Note that $1000 is an unusually large confidence interval for bitcoin; the confidence interval is typically ~$50 dollars). You therefore calculate that the true price is between $49000 and $51000. When originating the loan, you would value the bitcoin at $49000. The lower price is conservative in this instance because it limits the amount of borrowing that is possible while the price is uncertain. On the other hand, if you were to issue a loan of bitcoin, you would value the borrowed bitcoin at $51000. The higher price is conservative, as it protects you from allowing someone to borrow in excess during times of increased volatility.

The same principle would apply if you wrote a derivative contract. If someone wants to open a derivative contract with you, you would value their collateral at the lower price. However, if you were deciding whether someone's margin limits were violated, you could value their outstanding leveraged position at the higher price. If a contract needs to be settled at a price, you could take approaches such as the following:

  1. Using Pyth's exponential moving average price, which represents estimates of the average price of the asset over a specified time period (e.g., over the past 1 hour). The exponential moving average price is computed such that it lessens the influence of prices with wide confidence intervals. You may find more details in ema-price-aggregation.md.
  2. Using the aggregate price, which is Pyth's best estimate of the price at a single point in time. The quality of this estimate depends on the width of the confidence interval at settlement time and on occasion, it may be imprecise. However, it is the best you can do with Pyth data if you need a single price at that exact point in time.
  3. Defining the contract to depend on confidence. For example, you could create an option that refunds the option premium to the buyer (so both sides of the transaction are even) if the strike price is within the confidence interval at settlement time. You could also create a contract that delayed settlement until the confidence interval was sufficiently small. If you choose this second option, you should ensure that your contract is guaranteed to eventually settle even if the confidence interval never narrows.